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Abstract 
 
Globally many regulators adopted a rules-based approach to independent director 
appointments stipulating „independence‟ criteria. This paper investigates whether 
partitioning a regulatory compliant sample of independent director appointments by 
prior affiliation to the board influences the relationship between ownership and 
control rights, and performance. We report a significant positive relationship between 
board independence and controlling shareholders‟ cash-flow rights for firms where 
the appointee had prior affiliation to the board, but no performance improvement. 
Firms where the regulatory compliant independent directors had no prior-affiliation to 
the board experienced significant improvement in firms‟ next period Return-on-
Assets.  Appointing affiliated directors is indicative diminished board quality, which 
is consistent with the empirical evidence that controlling shareholders determine 
board quality to accommodate tunneling to extract the private benefits of control to 
compensate for significant additional costs associated with concentrated ownership 
(Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Luo et al, 2012; Liu et al, 2015). The positive association 
between performance and unaffiliated independent directors suggests a desire to 
introduce expertise to receive benefits via improved firm performance which is 
consistent with the literature, mostly from studies of emerging markets, reporting a 
causal link from independent directors to firm performance (Choi et al, 2007; Dahya 
et al. 2008; Liu et al, 2015).   
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 2 
1. Introduction 
 
Inadequate corporate governance systems were believed to have contributed to, and 
exacerbated, the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis which provided impetus for reform in 
the region (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Prowse, 1998; OECD, 1999; Johnson, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000a).  A central tenet of Taiwan‟s reform package 
included enhancing board independence. Policy makers succumb to the conventional 
wisdom and recommended the introduction of the independent director system. From 
February 2002 listed firms were advised to appoint at least two independent directors 
and one independent supervisor to their board, whereas for new listings it was 
compulsory. Consequently, Taiwanese boards experienced a significant increase in 
the reported number of independent board member appointments over a concentrated 
period of time following the introduction of the voluntary governance code in 2002 
(Liu and Yang, 2008; Young, sai and Hsieh, 2008). 
Taiwan is an environment where controlling shareholders have overwhelming 
power to influence board composition with the 2002 governance reforms providing an 
institutional setting akin to a natural experiment (Filatotchev, Lien and Piesse, 2005; 
Strange, Lien, Piesse and Filatotchev, 2005, Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Chou, Chung 
and Yin, 2013). Consistent with agency theory and empirical evidence, we proceed on 
the working assumption that controlling shareholders are self-interested and will only 
enhance board independence if they believe it is in their interest to do so (Classens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; Classens, Fan and Lang, 2006; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; 
Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2009; Liu, Miletkov, 
Wei and Yang, 2015). This paper evaluates the relationship between independent 
director appointments and the extent to which controlling shareholder‟s cash-flow 
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 3 
rights influence appointments, and if the definition of „independence‟ influences this 
relationship and subsequent firm performance.   
        Initially, we evaluate the full sample of firms comprising regulatory compliant 
independent director appointments.  Consistent with the literature for emerging 
markets characterized by concentrated ownership we find that cash-flow rights 
(ownership) is significantly positively correlated with board independence whereas 
excess control rights (deviation of cash-flow from control-rights) is significantly 
negatively correlated with board independence. Typically, these findings would be 
attributed to the incentive-alignment and entrenchment hypotheses. Next, we examine 
the impact of prior-affiliation to the board. Empirical evidence highlights the 
importance of social ties when determining independence beyond conventional 
regulatory definitions. Hwang and Kim (2009) report that US boards went from being 
87% independent under the conventional definition of independence to 62% when 
informal ties between directors and CEOs were accounted for. Likewise, in Taiwan, 
Liu and Yang (2008) report that the majority (58.4%) of board member appointments 
announced in 2002 as „new‟ independent directors sat on the board of the same 
company in 2001. When we partition our sample by affiliated and unaffiliated 
independent appointments we find that cash-flow-rights are only significantly 
positively correlated with the appointment of affiliated independent directors, but had 
no influence on the appointment of unaffiliated independent directors. The positive 
association between controlling shareholders cash-flow-rights and the appointment of 
affiliated directors in Taiwan can be interpreted as reflecting the desire of controlling 
shareholders to diminish board quality (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). Luo et al. (2012) 
provide a more sophisticated analysis for this result than is typically cited in the 
literature.  They argue that controlling shareholders are subject to significant 
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 4 
additional costs as block shareholders including additional risk from a lack of 
diversification, additional costs for information collection, processing and monitoring 
management, and are exposed to liquidity restrictions which results in a high discount 
on block shares‟ price in comparison to otherwise identical stock.  Over low-to-
medium levels of ownership incentive-alignment effects dominate which act as a 
substitute for independent directors and therefore predicts a negative relationship and 
a reduction in tunneling. While from medium-to-high levels of ownership costs 
increase exponentially and as a consequence controlling shareholders has an incentive 
to extract the private benefits of control via tunneling. This model argues that a 
positive association over medium-to-high levels of ownership reflects an 
entrenchment effect. In the context of our analysis the decrease in board quality from 
appointing affiliated independent directors is consistent with a desire to accommodate 
tunneling which may also explain the lack of any relationship between affiliated 
independent director appointments and performance given that “tunneling” in practice 
involves controlling shareholders‟ extracting the private benefits of control which 
involving the transfer of assets and profits out of firms via transfer pricing, subsidized 
personal loans, related party transactions, outright theft, higher CEO compensation 
and value-destroying acquisitions (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; 
Masulis et al., 2009; Su, Xu and Phan, 2008).  
Stronger more independent boards have been credited with performance 
improvements for firms characterized by concentrated ownership (Bae, Kang and 
Kim, 2002; Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Dahya et al., 2008; Young et al., 2008; 
Black and Kim, 2012; Liu et al., 2015). We find a significant positive relationship 
between unaffiliated independent director appointments and subsequent firm 
performance reflected in a significant increase in next period Return-on-Assets. 
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Whereas it was statistically insignificant for affiliated independent director 
appointments. A consistent robust finding throughout our analysis is a concave-
quadratic relationship between board size and the demand for independent directors. 
This specification entered our analysis primarily as a control variable. The 
consistency of this relationship throughout our analysis provides a pointer for further 
research.  
Our findings provide important insights for Taiwan and the general literature 
on board independence. Our initial results showing statistically significant 
relationships for measures of incentive-alignment and entrenchment are consistent 
with the extant literature. When prior-affiliation to the board is introduced to the 
analysis only affiliated appointments are statistically significantly correlated with 
controlling shareholders cash-flow-rights. However, in terms of performance, 
improvements are driven by unaffiliated independent directors. It‟s important to 
remember our analysis is predicated on the assumption that controlling shareholders 
have the power to appoint who they choose: affiliated or unaffiliated. It appears from 
our analysis that when they desire performance improvement they appoint unaffiliated 
expertise, whereas when they wish to accommodate tunneling to provide a substitute 
channel to compensate for the costs of block ownership they reduce board quality by 
appointing affiliated independent directors. 
Generally, it is important to note that in a voluntary enhancement institutional 
environment controlling shareholders chose a mix of independent directors whom 
they knew previously and who were new to the board, who then appear to have made 
different contributions. We posed the question: are regulatory compliant independent 
director appoints all the same? Our analysis clearly demonstrates that their 
contributions differ. From a regulator‟s perspective a natural question, or thought 
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experiment, to conduct is to ask if these appointments were in the best interests of all 
stakeholders including minority shareholders and can these insights provide a policy 
recommendation to improve the rules-based appointment criteria? If performance 
benefits can be attributed to the appointment of unaffiliated independent directors, the 
question arises whether it is in everyone‟s best interest for regulators to stipulate 
unaffiliated independent appointments to boards of firms where controlling 
shareholders have significant cash-flow-rights and, as has been documented 
empirically, are unlikely to enhance independence. This should improve board quality 
and possibly ameliorate the principal-principal agency problem. There is significant 
scope for extending research in this area to quantify if firms characterized by highly 
concentrated ownership who appointed affiliated independent directors subsequently 
engaged in tunneling.  
Our analysis took place during Taiwan‟s 2002-2004 nascent stage of 
governance reform which helps complete the governance jigsaw for Taiwan and 
developing economies. It may help inform the ongoing independent director debate in 
Taiwan. New rules from 2015
1
 allow for the re-election of independent directors 
which comprises affiliated and unaffiliated independent directors. And that all listed 
firms should have independent directors on the board between 2015 and 2017 
consistent with 3-year election cycles which leads to all firms having independent 
directors by 2017. However, this is for appointments under the regulatory criteria of 
independence. At the very least, our analysis should convince regulators to consider 
the definition of independence and consider the possibility that the degree of 
independence can have differential effects. Self-interested controlling shareholders 
will appoint individuals whom they believe protect their interests in a voluntary 
                                                 
1
 Security Exchange Act, Article 14-2. The detail of rules please refer to section 2.1. 
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environment. The contemporary challenge for Taiwanese regulators is to develop 
appointments rules which protect the interests of all stakeholders. Our analysis 
suggests that prior-affiliation to controlling shareholders and to the board is a 
dimension they should consider. A simple rule derived from our analysis could be that 
independent directors must not have sat on the board previously. Overall, our findings 
contribute to the literature supporting a causal link from independent directors to 
performance for developing economies, and the relatively limited results examining 
social ties.   
        The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the context of 
the paper by providing an overview of Taiwan‟s corporate governance reforms and 
provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 develops our 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample and methodology, while section 5 presents 
the empirical results and discusses opportunities for further research. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1.  Corporate Governance in Taiwan 
Taiwan, like many other East-Asian economies, followed the global trend of 
governance reform with the 1997-98 Asian financial Crisis providing impetus for 
change in the region. Liu and Yang (2008) account the details of the reform and 
associated academic and legal references. Taiwan adhered to the conventional 
wisdom and adopted the independent director system as one mechanism for protecting 
the interests of minority shareholders (OECD, 1999; Clarke, 2006; Liu and Yang, 
2008). From February 2002 Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) and GreTai 
Securities Market (GTSM, an OTC market) listing rules were amended requiring new 
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listing‟s boards to include at least two independent directors and one independent 
supervisor.  Ostensibly, supervisors have extensive powers with the remit to monitor 
and discipline management, and to act as conduits for dispute resolution between 
management and shareholders. If they have the support of the shareholders they can, 
in theory, remove senior management. It would therefore appear that supervisors 
provide a robust independent monitoring mechanism similar to that advocated for 
non-executive directors in the US and UK. In practice anecdotal and empirical 
evidence does not support this conjecture.
2
 
        To necessitate successful introduction of an independent director system the 
Company Act 2001 was amended to eliminate shareholder requirements to allow for 
non-shareholding professionals to become eligible for appointment as directors and 
supervisors
3
. Beforehand, shareholding requirements tended to increase the extent of 
board affiliation to controlling families as family members more often than not had 
the necessary level of ownership to be considered for appointment to the board 
(Filatotchev et al., 2005). Taiwan‟s „Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles 
for TWSE/GTSM Listed Companies‟ (hereinafter the Code), published in 2002, was 
modeled on OECD corporate governance principles. The Code allowed the separation 
of independent directors‟ and supervisors‟ compensations plans from those of other 
directors. While the Code was endorsed both by the TWSE and GTSM, it was 
implemented on a voluntary basis.
4
 Even though Taiwan‟s corporate governance code 
                                                 
2
 Strange et al. (2005), Filatotchev et al. (2005), Yeh and Woidtke (2005) and Liu and Yang (2008) 
collectively provide a synopsis of Taiwan‟s institutional background and detail the precise roles and 
responsibilities of supervisors. The tenet of the argument we are primarily interested in here is to 
establish the degree of supervisor independence and significant idiosyncratic features. We direct 
interested readers to these citations for a detailed account and also for a comparison of Taiwan with 
other similar governance systems. 
3
 Company Act, Article 192 (for TWSE firms) and 216 (for GTSM firms). 
4
 From January 2007 onward it was compulsory for financial institutions and listed non-financial 
companies to have paid-in-capital of more than NT$ 50 billion (Security and Exchange Act, article 14-
2).  They were required to have at least two independent directors or at least one-fifth of directors on a 
company board had to be independent. The Taiwanese government further enhances corporate 
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was introduced on a voluntary basis it led to a significant change in board 
composition over a relatively concentrated period. Young et al. (2008) point out that 
„surprisingly‟ the proportion of unaffected firms that voluntarily appointed at least 
one independent director increased significantly from 5.99% in 2001 to 36.42% in 
2002. Liu and Yang (2008) report that 58.4% of independent directors announced to 
be new board appointments sat on the board of the same company in 2001. Their 
status on the board was changed simply by adding „independent‟ to their original title.   
 
2.2. Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
Considerable empirical investigation has sought to assess how various monitoring and 
control mechanisms ameliorate management behaviour with various degrees of 
separation of ownership from control, with the resultant moral hazard problem, 
asymmetric information and atomistic, or highly dispersed, ownership. Governance 
characteristics typically found in the US and UK. In contrast, ownership around the 
globe tends to be concentrated (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Bebchuk, Kraakman 
and Triantis, 2000; Classens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; Classens, Fan and Lang, 
2006). Ownership in East-Asian economies is also typically concentrated which is 
achieved through the issuance of dual-class shares, cross-holdings and the creation of 
pyramidal holdings which allows for this divergence between control and cash-flow 
rights. 
        Concentrated ownership structure shifts the focus away from management 
expropriating from minority shareholders to majority shareholders who have the 
opportunity to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (e.g., Grossman and 
Hart, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Bebchuk et al. (2000) provide an analytical 
                                                                                                                                            
governance by mandating all listed companies to include independent directors on their boards between 
2015 and 2017. 
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framework to help identify the incentive structure of an entrenched minority 
shareholder when the threat of takeover is absent. The key prediction from their 
model is that, in the absence of constraints, agency-costs associated with concentrated 
ownership firms increase rapidly as the fraction of equity cash-flow rights held by the 
controller declines. Legal systems have the potential to impose significant constraints 
on controllers‟ propensity to expropriate. In the context of East-Asian economies, 
empirical evidence suggests that it is unlikely given the civil law origin of many of 
the country‟s legal systems with a substitution effect between external and internal 
governance mechanisms, such as board structure, being relatively more important 
(LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silnes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Ferreira and Matos, 2008;).  It is more likely that these countries legal systems 
enhance controllers‟ expropriation opportunities. Johnson et al. (2000a) introduce the 
concept of „tunneling‟, which they define as „…the transfer of assets and profits out 
of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders’. Their essential contribution 
is to highlight how courts in countries which have emerged from the civil law 
tradition accommodate tunneling. Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000b) also 
provide a model in which a sudden loss of investor confidence, in conjunction with 
weak enforcement of minority investor‟s right, leads outside investors to reassess 
managers‟ propensity to expropriate. Consequently, they adjust their capital 
commitment resulting in a fall in asset values and an exchange rate collapse. Their 
subsequent empirical analysis of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis provides empirical 
support for this contention. Bae et al. (2002) investigation of Korean business groups‟ 
acquisitions activity provides evidence supporting the tunneling hypothesis. Overall, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that legal systems rooted in the civil law tradition, 
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which provide weak investor protection, don‟t appear to impose a significant 
constraint on controlling shareholders in economies like Taiwan.  
       Controlling shareholders‟ propensity to expropriate from minority shareholders 
may be curtailed by the introduction of independent directors.
5
 They are purported to 
contribute strategically to corporate policy and/or represent a credible cost-effective 
monitoring and control mechanism (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). 
Globally, corporate governance reformers in concentrated ownership economies alike 
have been convinced by the perceived benefits of outside director representation on 
boards. A raft of countries recommended, or made mandatory, minimum levels of 
independent director representation on corporate boards: specifying either the number, 
fraction, or a combination of both, and stipulating „independence‟ criteria for 
independent director appointees (Dahya and McConnell, 2007).  
        General governance factors, including ownership structure and board 
characteristics, have been linked to strategic decision making and contemporaneous, 
short- and long-term corporate performance (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Cho, 
1998; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Filatotchev et al. 2005; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). 
Specifically, in the case of independent directors, they have been shown to have been 
a significant factor in US take-over bids and defenses, were more likely to join firms 
who had performed poorly, and that their appointment to large firms led to a 
significant positive market response (e.g. Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994; Cotter, 
Shivdasani and Zellner, 1997; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Mace, 1986). UK 
                                                 
5
 Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) survey the literature on the role of boards. We direct readers 
new to the literature to this paper. In this paper we focus on the how outside director classification as 
independent and their impact on performance primarily for concentrated ownership studies. The 
evidence from studies for dispersed ownership, mostly US, identifies three reason why the empirical 
evidence failed to establish a causal link between outside directors and performance: endogeneity 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Lehn, Petro and Zhao, 2009), the impact of poor past performance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003), and listing requirements and research design problems (Dahya and 
McConnell, 2007). 
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evidence supports the contention that the appointment of independent directors led to 
a significant positive market response, which exhibited a temporal pattern, was 
conditional upon interaction between the magnitude of the agency costs and the 
monitoring incentives of the appointee, and that firms who complied with the 
Cadbury Report recommendation of three outside directors experienced a significant 
improvement in operating performance with the appointment of non-executive 
directors viewed positively by the market (Lin, Pope and Young, 2003; Peasnell, Pope 
and Young, 2003; Hamill, McGregor and Rasaratham, 2006; Dahya and McConnell, 
2005, 2007; Mura, 2007). 
        In countries with weak legal protection for investors, which also tend to have 
concentrated ownership structure, firms are subject to a market value discount 
reflecting the propensity of controlling shareholders to expropriate resources 
(Classens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shelifer, 
2002). Dahya et al. (2008) report that, for a sample of firms spanning twenty-two 
countries, that dominant shareholders with an incentive to off-set the market value 
discount can do so, to some extent, by appointing an independent board. However, 
their sample does not include Taiwanese firms. Luo et al (2012) develop a theoretical 
model, and test its predictions for a sample of Chinese companies from 2003 to 2006. 
They predict a non-linear, convex-quadratic (U-shaped), relationship between 
controlling shareholder‟s cash-flow rights and the extent to which they extract private 
benefits of control. Their model rests on the well-documented substitution effect of 
concentrated ownership for ineffective legal systems in emerging economies and the 
additional costs borne by controlling shareholders and the net cost-benefit which leads 
to the predicted U-shaped relationship which emerges over low to high levels of 
ownership concentration. Over low levels of ownership incentive-alignment effects 
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dominate with a negative relationship between controlling shareholders cash-flow 
rights and extraction of private benefits of control (PBC), which becomes positive 
over medium to high levels as controlling shareholders seek to extract PBC to 
compensate for the exponential increase in cost associated with concentrated 
ownership. They empirically assess the PBC using the price premium for block share 
transactions. The report that the average size of the PBC is 10.66% and firms with 
more independent directors on the board and firms with multiple large shareholders 
had significantly lower PBC for controlling shareholders. Consistent with their 
theoretical model, they also report a significant non-linear relationship between 
controlling shareholder‟s PBC and their cash-flow rights. More recently, Liu et al. 
(2015) investigate the board independence-performance relationship for a 
comprehensive sample of firms, from 1999 to 2012, listed on China‟s Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. They report a significant improvement in firms‟ operating 
performance which was found to be more pronounced for government-controlled 
firms and in firms where the costs of acquiring firm specific information was lower 
for independent directors. They also report that firms which voluntarily appointed 
independent directors prior to China‟s deadline on 30th June 2003 experienced higher 
performance than those that did not, and that firms that appointed more independent 
directors than the required minimum following the deadline also experienced 
significantly better performance than those who chose not to exceed the minimum 
threshold of one-third independent directors. Overall, they conclude board 
independence reduces tunneling. 
In general, there has been limited analysis of corporate governance issues in 
Taiwan. The extant literature focuses on the influence between ownership structure 
and corporate events such as proxy contests, financial distress, firm performance, and 
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foreign direct investment decisions (e.g. Huang and Yen, 1996; Ko, Ding, Liu and 
Yeh, 1999; Yeh, Lee and Woidtke, 2001; Filatotchev et al. 2005; Strange et al., 2005).  
Yeh and Woidtke (2005) investigate the determinants of board composition and firm 
valuation effects for a sample of non-financial listed companies in 1998. They report 
that controlling shareholders influence the board selection process, and the extent of 
director affiliation to controlling families is a suitable proxy for governance quality: a 
board with a majority of affiliated directors being indicative of poor quality 
governance, and vice versa. Ensuring board dominance came at a cost with firms with 
controlling families subject to a market value discount. Young et al. (2008) 
investigate the factors that motivated Taiwanese firms to voluntarily increase board 
independence by appointing independent directors in response to governance reforms 
introduced from 2002 and the subsequent impact on firm performance. They report a 
positive performance impact and that firms with weaker alternative governance 
mechanisms and greater agency costs were more likely to voluntarily improve their 
board independence, whereas firms with family CEOs and family-dominated boards 
were less likely to voluntarily improve board independence; a result supporting the 
managerial power view.  
 
3. Hypothesis development  
Incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects have been proxied by ownership and 
control variables which attempt to capture various facets of controlling shareholders‟ 
incentives. Ownership is calculated from cash-flow rights whereas control is based on 
voting rights (Classens et al. 2000, 2006; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). Ownership tests 
the incentive-alignment hypothesis whereas divergence of ownership from control 
tests the entrenchment hypothesis. Controlling shareholders face a utility maximizing 
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objective function which trades off the benefits from signaling to the market potential 
value enhancing decisions, such as the appointment of independent directors and 
supervisors, against the benefits from expropriation. As cash-flow rights increase, or 
divergence between control and cash-flow lights is minimal, controlling shareholders 
benefit from increasing shareholder wealth relative to the benefit from forgoing the 
opportunity to expropriate. In this situation, controlling shareholders prefer to appoint 
independent directors or supervisors to signal that they intend enhancing the quality of 
the board by enhancing board independence. This leads to our first testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Ceteris paribus, ownership (Cash-flow rights) is positively 
correlated with the appointment of independent directors and supervisors. 
 
        Ownership and control patterns reported in the empirical literature confirm that 
for many economies controlling shareholders‟ control rights significantly exceeds 
their cash-flow rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Classens et al., 
2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Consistent with the rationale underpinning the 
development of hypothesis 1, as the divergence between control and cash-flow rights 
increases, the benefit to controlling shareholders from the opportunity to expropriate 
potentially exceed relative gains in shareholder wealth. Consequently, it would be 
expected that if controlling shareholders wished to extract the private benefits from 
control, or „tunnel‟, resources at the expense of minority investors they are less likely 
to appoint possibly interfering independent directors and supervisors. This leads to 
our second testable hypothesis, the entrenchment-hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): Ceteris paribus, divergence in ownership from control is 
negatively correlated with the appointment of independent directors and 
supervisors. 
 
        A common theme in the independent director literature is support for agency 
theory, both principal-agent and principal-principal varieties, which simple highlights 
those with power and control have a tendency to engage in self-serving behavior:  
professional managers with dispersed ownership and controlling shareholders when 
ownership is concentrated (e.g. Classens et. al. 2002; Classens et. al. 2006; La Porta 
et. al., 2002; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Dahya et. al. 2008). Typically, studies 
evaluating self-serving behaviour of executives who have an incentive to expropriate 
due to an ability to drive a wedge between ownership and control for European, Asian, 
and East-Asian firms. Masulis et al. (2009) provide an important contrast for a sample 
of US firms with dual-class shares. They support the agency hypothesis and identify 
channels through which executives expropriate resources and destroy firm value. 
Previously we argued that the opportunity to drive a wedge between control (voting 
rights) and cash-flow rights aggravates the agency problem. As insiders control 
disproportionately more voting rights than cash-flow rights and as a consequence bear 
a smaller proportion of the financial consequences of their decisions (Masulis et al., 
2009). In the context of concentrated ownership firms, minority shareholders only 
benefit from a positive externality if it is in the controlling shareholders interest to 
increase firm value. The empirical evidence reporting an off-set of the market value 
discount accompanying the appointment of stronger more independent boards by 
Dahya et al. (2008) comes about simply because controlling shareholders have an 
incentive to signal to the market they intend refraining from diverting resources away 
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from the firm for their personal benefit. An important aspect of the independent 
director debate is the definition of „independence‟. Typically, governance codes 
specify an „independence criteria’ defining independence from the CEO, and/or its 
director(s) is subjective. Hwang and Kim (2009) evaluate the degree of director 
independence for two criteria: a traditional metric based on whether a director has 
financial or familial ties to the CEO, and a second criteria encompassing informal ties 
including mutual alma mater, military service, regional origin, academic discipline 
and industry. They report that 87% of boards in the US are conventionally 
independent whereas 62% are conventionally and socially independent.  
Cash-flow rights and deviation of cash-flow from control rights are standard proxy 
variables in the concentrated ownership literature to capture controlling shareholder 
incentive-alignment and entrenchment.  Where our paper differs is in the definition of 
director independence. Similar to Liu and Yang (2008) and Hwang and Kim (2009), 
we employ two criteria: that promulgated by the regulatory authorities and a simple 
„affiliated‟ versus „unaffiliated‟ criteria. If a new independent director sat on the same 
board the previous year they were categorized as affiliated and vice versa for 
unaffiliated. Empirically, we test H1 and H2 under both criteria. Independence from, 
and affiliation to, controlling shareholders/CEOs/board is at the heart of the 
independent director literature. Ex-ante, we believe this approach has the potential to 
contribute to the literature and contribute to the ongoing policy debate in Taiwan. 
Introducing a simple affiliation criterion builds upon the logic of Liu and Yang (2008) 
and Hwang and Kim (2009), who investigate the impact of conventional 
independence stipulated by the governance code, to account for the potential influence 
of prior affiliation.   
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 18 
        While UK and the US firms share similar ownership and control structures, 
outside director representation is an area of notable difference. The boards of US 
firms have historically had significant outside director representation. In contrast, 
prior to the 1990s, UK boards were dominated by executive inside directors (Peasnell, 
Pope and Young, 2003). It wasn‟t until firms began complying with the recommended 
three non-executive directors of the Cadbury Report (1992) that the makeup of the 
boardroom changed significantly. An event study analysis from 1993 to 1996 by Lin 
et al. (2003) reported that the average impact was indistinguishable from zero, but 
when board ownership was low and appointees had strong monitoring incentive the 
market reaction was higher. In contrast for a sample of non-financial firms from 1989 
to 1996 Dahya and McConnell (2007) report a significant increase in shareholder 
wealth of 0.44% when the announcement of an outside director appointment brought 
the number of outside directors to the recommended Cadbury level of at least 3. They 
also document a significant improvement in operating performance whereas Mura 
(2007) reports a significant positive relationship between the proportion of outside 
directors on the board and firms‟ performance (Tobin‟s q). Dahya et al. (2008) report 
that for a sample of 22 developed and developing countries in 2002, excluding 
Taiwan, that firm value (market-to-book value ratios) is positively correlated with the 
fraction of the board composed of independent directors. Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) 
investigate if enforced introduction of the outside director system affected 
performance (Tobin‟s q). The Korean Government‟s mandated a minimum 25% 
outside director representation for the boards of listed firms in 1997. Previously, 
outside representation was uncommon. Choi et al. find that the proportion of 
independent outside directors was positively correlated with performance as well as 
foreign institutional ownership. And that idiosyncratic domestic factors such as family 
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or chaebol affiliation reduced performance. Black and Kim (2012) also provide 
evidence supporting the board independence-performance relationship in Korea which 
was conditional upon firm size, with Liu et al. (2015) also reporting operating 
performance benefits to enhancing board independence for Chinese firms.  
Collectively, there is a growing literature supporting a causal link from board 
independence to performance for emerging markets. One aim of this paper is provide 
additional country-specific evidence for Taiwan.  Consequently, for our third testable 
hypothesis we have: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Ceteris paribus, the appointment of independent 
directors is positively correlated with firm’s subsequent operating 
performance.  
 
4.  
4.1. Data  
The initial sample for this study consists of all non-financial firms listed on the TWSE 
and GTSM from 2002 to 2004. According to the TWSE and GTSM listing rule only 
IPO companies which listed after February 2002 must have at least two independent 
directors and one independent supervisor. Consequently, new listings were excluded.  
Board composition data was collected from annual reports, company prospectus, 
MOPS and „Business Groups in Taiwan‟, which is published by China Credit 
Information Services Ltd.
6
 Accounting data and ownership data such as control rights 
and cash-flow rights were collected from the Taiwan Economics Journal (TEJ) 
                                                 
6
 Market Observation Post System (MOPS) is set by TWSE and GTSM (http://newmops.com.tw/). 
China Credit Information Service LTD is a databank company that has been in business for more than 
three decades. „Business Groups in Taiwan‟ provides the group-affiliation information and family ties 
to assist us to these ultimate ownership, pyramid structure and cross-shareholding in group-affiliated 
companies. 
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database. Financial firms and firms where the ownership and accounting data could 
not be found were eliminated. Taiwanese listed companies re-elect directors and 
supervisors at the annual general meeting every three years, and also usually select 
independent directors and independent supervisors during the re-election. This study 
collected sample for firms which had a re-election at the annual general meeting from 
2002 to 2004. Table 1 reports the selection criteria of this study. The initial sample of 
firms listed on the TWSE and GTSM in 2002 are 544 and 334 companies, 
respectively. After eliminated IPO companies which listed after February 2002 (67 
firms in TWSE and 48 firms in GTSM) and financial companies (27 firms in TWSE 
and 13 firms in GTSM), the sample consists of 450 firms on the TWSE and 273 firms 
on the GTSM. Also, based on the re-election process, there are 168, 145 and 137 
firms for 2002, 2003 and 2004 for TWSE, and 85, 91 and 97 firms from 2002 to 2004, 
respectively. Consequently, after eliminating firms where the ownership or 
accounting data was missing, a total of 416 companies listed on the TWSE and 169 
companies listed on the GTSM were in the final sample.  
        Companies were classified into two groups: if a company appointed an 
independent director or independent supervisor, it was classified as a compliant firm.
7
 
Under this classification, there are 45, 26, 29 (27, 19, 9) firms in TWSE (GTSM) were 
classified into the compliant group from 2002 to 2004, respectively.  Initially, we 
adopt the independence criteria stipulated in Article 9 of the TSE Listing rules, Article 
17 of the Supplementary Provisions, and Articles 10 and 10-1 of the GTSM Listing 
rules. Young et al. (2008) adopt the same criteria.  An independent director fulfils the 
following criteria: has a minimum of 5 years of relevant experience in business, law, 
finance or firm operations; is not an employee of the firm nor a director, supervisor, 
                                                 
7
 Only a few companies complied fully - at least two independent directors and at least one independent 
supervisor - on the board. 
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or employee of one of its affiliated enterprises; does not directly or indirectly own 
more than 1% of the firm‟s outstanding shares, nor is (s)he one of the top ten 
institutional shareholders; is not a member of the core family (e.g., spouse, child, 
parent, grandchild, grandparent, or sibling) of any person specified in the preceding 
two conditions; is not a director, supervisor, or employee of a legal entity which 
directly or indirectly owns more than 5% of the firm‟s issued shares, nor a director, 
supervisor, or employee of the top five legal entities that hold the shares; is not a 
director, supervisor, or manager of a firm or institution which has business 
relationships with the firm, nor a shareholder who owns more than 5% of such a firm; 
is not an owner, partner, director supervisor, manager, or spouse of any sole 
proprietor business, partnership firm, or institution that provided the firm or its 
affiliates with financial, business, consulting, or legal services in the previous year; is 
not a juridical person or its representative pursuant to Article 27 of Taiwanese 
Company Law. Firms are required to disclose in their annual report how their board 
of directors conforms with this independence criteria, and are required to disclose in 
accordance with „Criteria Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports 
of Public Firms‟. We further classified the compliance group into affiliated 
independent appointment and unaffiliated independent appointment. There are 30, 11, 
7 (17, 9, 2) firms in TWSE (GTSM) classified as affiliated independent appointments 
who was already sat on the board before the election year from 2002 to 2004.  
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
4.2. Model 
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The objective of this study is to investigate the influence of ownership structure and 
board characteristics on firms‟ decision to appoint independent directors and 
supervisors to corporate boards in Taiwan. We examine this issue using the following 
modeling framework: 
N K R
it n nit k kit r rit it
n 1 k 1 r 1
Compliant Own Board Control    
  
                         (1) 
        Where Compliant is independent director or supervisor appointments to firm i in 
year t, Own is a vector of N ownership-level variables, Board is a vector of K board-
level variables, and Control is a vector of R firm-level control variables. Equation 2 
empirically implements equation 1. 
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        Initially we treat independent director and supervisor appointments the same and 
model them as the proportion of outside directors over total board members (e.g. 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
Specifically, we have the logistic transformation of the proportion of independent 
directors and supervisors on the board which is defined as follow: 









)(1
log


IND
IND
y                                                                                                 (3) 
where, 
   y          is the log transformation of proportion of independent board members 
   IND     is the proportion of independent board members over total board members 
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   μ          is 810  
 
        The log transformation method is applied to ensure that the predicted value of 
IND derived from the fitted model fall between 0 and 1 (Kennedy, 1996; Pesanell et 
al., 2003). Alternatively, the appointment of independent directors or supervisors can 
be coded as „1‟ and „0‟ otherwise. The first specification implies that OLS is an 
appropriate estimator whereas the dichotomous specification implies a Logit/Probit 
estimator. Finally, we partition the sample into sub-samples depending on whether the 
appointment was deemed as being an affiliated independent appointment, or an 
unaffiliated independent appointment. We identify affiliated using the same process 
as Liu and Yang‟s (2008). We first identify new independent directors and 
supervisors appointments to the boards during the re-election year. We then check if 
these directors and supervisors were new compared to the directors and supervisors 
before the re-election year. If a firm has at least one affiliated independent director or 
supervisor on the board in the re-election year, we identify it as an affiliated 
independent appointment.  
         
Insert table 2 about here 
     
        Table 2 provides a concise summary of each independent variable along with the 
predicted sign for each coefficient in equation 2. To construct the appropriate 
variables to test the ownership structure hypotheses it is necessary to quantify the 
extent of controlling shareholders cash-flow rights and excess rights (divergence 
between control and cash-flow rights). Ownershipt-1 is based on cash-flow rights and 
control is based on voting rights. Cash-flow rights and voting rights were identified 
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from pyramid and cross-holdings schemes. La Porta et al. (1999) identify 20% cut-off 
to trace the controlling shareholder in the company. We use the same 20% cutoff 
point to identify ultimate owners. Consistent with La Porta et al. (1999), direct voting 
rights were identified as the fraction of shares held by ultimate owners, and indirect 
voting rights are based on the latest link in the chain of shares held by entities or 
nominal companies that are in turn controlled by the ultimate owners. Thus, the 
controlling (ultimate) shareholder is defined as a shareholder or family group who has 
the largest control rights by combining direct and indirect voting rights. Ultimate 
owners of Taiwanese publicly held companies usually use nominal investment 
companies or other entities (such as non-profit entities, e.g. hospital, school etc.) to 
increase their control rights. Excesst-1 is the divergence between cash-flow rights and 
voting rights for largest controlling shareholder. We use ultimate‟s shareholder‟s 
control rights minus cash-flow rights times one minus director pledged ratio to 
measure excess control. The director pledge ratio is measured as the percentage of 
directors‟ shareholdings that are pledged for loans and credits one year before the 
fiscal year.
8
 In model 2, the point estimates β1 for the Ownershipt-1 variable tests the 
incentive-alignment hypothesis H1. The point estimates β2 for Excesst-1 test the 
entrenchment-hypothesis H2. 
        The point estimate γ1 and γ2 are the proportion of directors or supervisors 
affiliated with the largest controlling shareholder to total number of directors or 
supervisors at the beginning of the year, respectively. The point estimate γ3 on 
Dualityt-1 is a dummy variable defined as one if CEO also serve as Chairman and zero 
otherwise. Our final board characteristics variable explores the relationship between 
the size of Taiwanese corporate boards and their propensity to appoint independent 
                                                 
8
 We also test the regressions by separating excess control and director pledged ratio. Both variables are 
statistically negatively significant related to the likelihood of independent director appointment. 
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directors and supervisors. Bsizet-1 is simply defined as the sum of board of directors 
and supervisors, while Bsizet-1
2
 is board sized squared to capture possible 
nonlinearities. Given that Taiwanese firms typically elect board members at annual 
general meetings every three years, the board composition from 2002 to 2004 and the 
decision to appoint independent directors and supervisors would have been taken by 
the board in power prior to the shareholders‟ general meeting. While we don‟t have 
strong prior theoretical justification to predict either a concave or convex non-linear 
relationship in the specific context of this study, Coles, Naveen and Lalitha (2008) 
report a convex quadratic relationship between board size and Tobin‟s Q for a sample 
of US firms suggesting that either very large, or very small, boards are optimal. 
Including a quadratic specification allows us to explore possible non-linearity. A 
lagged specification is appropriate for the variables outlined. 
        The extant empirical evidence suggests it prudent to include in the remaining 
vector of control variables estimates of contemporaneous and lagged performance 
(Hossain, Cahan and Adams, 2000; Hutchinson and Gul, 2002; Choi et al, 2007; 
Dahya and McConnell, 2007). Contemporaneous performance variables include 
Tobin‟s Q (Qi,t) and Return on Assets (ROAi,t). Tobin‟s Q is measured using La Porta 
et al.‟s (2002) method as the sum of market value of equity and the book value of debt 
divided by the book value of assets instead of using replacement cost of assets, 
because the replacement cost of assets is not available for Taiwanese firms. ROAi,t is 
after-tax earnings before interest divided by total assets.  One year lagged 
performance variables are Qi,t-1 and ROAi,t-1. Our remaining control variables include 
leverage (total debt divided by book value of total assets), Research and Development 
(R&D: R&D divided by Sales) as a measure of investment opportunity. Institute is the 
sum of domestic and foreign institutional shareholdings at the end of the year. Size is 
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the logarithm of book value of assets (million NT$). Market is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the company is listed on the TWSE and zero if the company is listed on 
the GTSM. Also, we include two-digit industry and year dummies as control variables. 
(e.g., Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Young et al., 2008).  
        Another objective of this study is to evaluate whether independent board 
members affect the firm performance. We examine this issue using the following 
regression framework: 
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 y denotes board independence variables. We use two types of variables to verify the 
independence of the board: the log transformation of proportion of independent board 
members which is verified from model 3 and the dummy variable equals one if the 
company appoints at least one independent director or supervisor on the board and 
equals zero otherwise. We further separate the independent director as an affiliated 
independent or an unaffiliated independent. This leads to the dummy variable equals 
one if board contain at least one affiliated independent director or supervisor and the 
dummy variable equals one if firm only appoints unaffiliated director(s) or 
supervisor(s) on the board and zero, otherwise. The point estimates η1 for the fraction 
of independent board members variable tests hypothesis H3. We add the same 
ownership, board and control variables from model 2. In this regression model we 
further add firm age to control its effect on ROA. Age is logarithm of firm age. All 
board and ownership explanatory variables are one year lagged. All other variables 
are contemporaneous. The definition of variables is defined by Table 2.  
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5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of firms. Panel A and B for TWSE 
and GTSM firms respectively classified by ownership, board characteristics and firm 
characteristics. In Panel A, average control is 29.84% and average ownership is 
25.05%, resulting in excess control of 4.79%. Compared with the median of the three 
ownership variables, median excess control is 1.01%, which is slightly smaller than 
average excess control. Also, the maximum control and ownership levels are 95.39% 
and 95.34%, but the third-quartile control and ownership levels are 42.46% and 
36.13%, respectively. This implies that a few companies have very high ownership 
and control levels which explains the divergence in the mean and median levels of 
excess control.  
        For board characteristics, the average number of directors (supervisors) is 
7.33(2.60). The average (median) proportion of controlled-affiliated directors and 
controlled-affiliated supervisors is 57.27% (57%) and 47.92% (50%), respectively. In 
approximately 29% of companies the largest shareholder held both the CEO and 
Chairman position before the annual meeting and the average size of the board was 
9.93. The average (median) directors‟ pledged ratio is 16.89% (3.01%). The median 
directors‟ pledged ratio is slightly smaller than its average and the maximum value of 
directors‟ pledged ratio is 98.75%. Highlighting that a few company‟s directors have 
pledged nearly all of their shares on loan and 75% of listed companies‟ directors 
pledged less than 29.12% of their shares on loan. Moreover, average (median) firm 
size in TWSE sample is NT$ 20.7 (NT$6.09) billion. Average (median) R&D 
expense over sale is 1.85% (0.59%). Tobin‟s Q ratio is 1.09, ROA is 3.90% and 
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leverage is 40.59% on average. Average lagged Q ratio is 1.07 and lagged ROA is 
3.42% with average (median) institutional ownership of 3.62% (0.89%). 
  
Insert table 3 and 4 about here 
  
       Comparing the descriptive statistics for GTSM companies, Panel B, we find: 38% 
of GTSM companies have the same CEO and Chairman while it is 29% for TWSE 
companies. Directors‟ pledged ratio in GTSM firms is 6.23%, which is somewhat less 
than in TWSE firms. Average firm size in GTSM listed firms is NT$3.44 billion, 
while average firm size of TWSE listed firms is NT$20.7 billion. Overall, the reported 
descriptive statistics, and the differences between TWSE and GTSM companies, are 
as expected. GTSM firms are smaller, younger, have smaller boards, lower level of 
director‟s pledging their shares, a higher percentages of dual roles, and lower levels of 
director and supervisor affiliation to controlling shareholders.  
        Correlations reported in Table 4 provide initial insights into the factors 
influencing the appointment of independent directors and supervisors. Ownership and 
Excess are statistically significant and with the expected sign which provides 
preliminary empirical evidence to support H1 and H2. The fraction of directors and 
supervisors affiliated to the controlling shareholders is significantly negatively 
correlated with the fraction of independents. ROA and Q, and lagROA and lagQ are a 
significantly positively correlated with board independence. Leverage and Firm size is 
significantly negatively correlated with board independence, and positively correlated 
with each other. This is consisted with the empirical finding that firms with a lower 
leverage ratio and larger firms institutional ownership is positively correlated with 
board independence. Overall, the descriptive statistics and correlations with the 
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fraction of independent directors and supervisors and between the independent 
variable provides preliminary evidence to support a number of our hypotheses and 
suggests that the variables have been constructed in a reasonable way. 
 
5.2. Compliance, ownership and board characteristics 
Table 5 reports the results for the OLS estimates of the model introduced in equation 
2 to formally test our hypotheses.
9
 We estimate equation 2 individually for each 
ownership variable and with board size entering our equation linearly to begin with 
and then as a quadratic. For brevity we only report the results for the quadratic 
specification given their significance. The F-statistic is significant across all models 
with an adjusted R-squared ranging from a minimum of 16.8% for model 4 to a 
maximum of 17.6% for model 1 providing evidence that our model has explanatory 
power. Again, for parsimony, we omit regression results with performance variables 
based on Q from table 5. Including ROA based performance metrics had higher 
explanatory power. Ownership is, as predicted, positively correlated with the fraction 
of independent board members at the 1% level. This supports the incentive-alignment 
hypothesis H1 which highlights the importance of controlling shareholders cash-flow 
rights. Excess is significantly negatively correlated with the fraction of independent 
board members at least at the 5% level for three of the four models and just above the 
5% level for model 3 with a t-statistic of 1.92 (-0.023/0.012) in support of the 
entrenchment hypothesis H2.   
 
Insert table 5 about here 
 
                                                 
9
 We also test the hypotheses by examining the Logit and Probit regression. The dependent variable is a 
dummy that equals one if the company appoints an independent director or supervisor on the board and 
equals zero, otherwise for Logit and Probit model. The results are similar to the OLS. 
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        For the board characteristics, the fraction of directors affiliated with the largest 
controlling shareholder across all models is statistically significant negatively 
correlated with  the fraction of independent board members at the 5% level. The 
fraction of supervisor affiliated with the largest controlling shareholder is negatively 
but not significantly related to the fraction of independent board members. Dual 
leadership structure boards do not appear to have an impact to the appointment of 
independent board member as this variable is insignificant across the board. Board 
size (Bsize) is insignificant across all models when it entered equation 2 linearly. 
When it is included as a quadratic specification Bsize is positive and significant at the 
1% level while board size squared (Bsize
2
) is negative at also significant at the 1% 
level. The positive sign on the Bsize coefficient combined with the negative sign on 
the coefficient for Bsize
2
 implies a concave-quadratic relationship  which implies that 
boards which are relatively small and those which are relatively large have the lowest 
percentage of independents. 
       For the control variables, both ROA and lagROA are positively correlated with 
the fraction of independent board members at the 1% level implying that higher past 
firm performance encourage firms to incorporate independent directors or supervisors 
on their boards. The remaining control variables were insignificant.     
 
Insert table 6 about here 
 
        Up to this point directors and supervisors appointed to the board were 
independent under the regulatory definition. To explore the potential effect of prior-
affiliation the sample is partitioned into affiliated and unaffiliated independent 
director appointments. Table 6 reports the results from re-specifying the dependent 
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variable which then employs a Multi-Nomial Logit estimator. Again we follow the 
same process for deriving the results reported in tables 5. For affiliated independent 
appointments we can support H1, but not support H2.  Affiliated supervisors (Supa) is 
statistically negatively correlated with affiliated independent director appointment at 
the 5% level. We also observe a consistent statistically significant non-linear, 
concave-quadratic, relationship between board size and the appointment of affiliated 
and unaffiliated independent directors.  
        We argued that Taiwan‟s nascent stage of governance reform was akin to an 
experimental setting. In a comply-or-explain adoption environment where controlling 
shareholders have significant influence over all aspects of corporate decision making, 
it appears that while the motivation behind affiliated independent and unaffiliated 
independent appointments share some similarities they are also influenced by 
idiosyncratic factors. It therefore appears that the independent director system was 
adopted, conditional upon the degree of independence, to meet perceived governance 
needs: to fulfill either just a monitoring role or contribute to strategic decision making. 
        We believe that the possibility of endogeneity is unlikely to bias our results 
given the institutional environment for independent director and supervisor 
appointments in Taiwan. Liu and Yang (2008) point out that controlling shareholders 
treat the shareholders‟ meeting as their personal game and that without support from 
controlling shareholders or block shareholders no independent director or supervisor 
would have the necessary votes to be elected. This not only mitigates the possibility 
of endogeneity, but also strengthens our research design. Given the overwhelming 
power of controlling shareholders the decision to adopt the independent director 
system, or not, in a comply-or-explain environment clearly reflects their preferences.   
        As a robustness check for the possibility of endogeneity we employ the strict 
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exogeneity test (Wooldridge, 2002). This test estimates a fixed effect regression 
where the appointment of independent director or supervisor is regressed against 
ownership, board and control variables, and leading values of these variables. If any 
of the leading variables are significant, it suggests that this variable responds to past 
independent board appointments and is endogenous. The results indicate that 
endogeneity between independent board appointment and the key independent 
variables doesn‟t appear to be a significant issue. 10 
 
5.3. Board Composition and Firm Value 
Table 7 reports the regression results for firm performance and board independence 
using OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors where the 
dependent variable is return on assets (ROA).
11
 Board independence and the board 
independence dummy variable are significantly positive correlated to firm 
performance at the 5% level, which support our third hypothesis H3. When we 
separate independent directors by affiliated and unaffiliated appointments, only 
unaffiliated appointment are statistically significant at the 1% level which isolates the 
source of performance improvement. In practical terms this result shows that firms 
who appoint unaffiliated independent directors, experience a significant increase in 
their operating firm performance in the following year. This also implies that a more 
independent board enhances firm performance. This finding is consistent with 
positive performance improvements reported for developing economies, and adds to 
the literature by identifying the importance of prior-affiliation in explaining the 
tangible benefits attributed to enhancing board independence (Dayha and McConnell, 
                                                 
10
 Result available upon request. 
11
 We also use Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable, we further control stock variance (it is the variance 
of stock monthly returns over two years prior to the re-election) in the model. The results do not 
support H3.    
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2007; Choi et al., 2007; Young et al. 2008; Black and Kim, 2012; Liu et al., 2015). 
        For ownership and board characteristics, a number of variables are statistically 
significantly related to operating performance. Ownership is positively associated 
with ROA at the 1% level across the four models, whereas Excess is positive but 
insignificant. This result is consistent with Choi et al. (2007) who support the 
incentive-alignment effect for dominant shareholders. There is evidence that affiliated 
supervisors are influential with coefficients significant at the 5% level across models 
2, 4 and 6, whereas affiliated directors would only be significant at the 10% level in 
models 1 and 3. These findings are consistent with Yeh and Woidtke (2005) that 
affiliated supervisors on the board has a detrimental impact on firm performance. In 
contrast, institutional ownership is significantly positively correlated with firm 
performance at the 1% level. CEO duality, board size and board size squared are not 
statistically significant. Combining the lack of a non-linear relationship between 
board size and performance with our previous finding of a significant concave-
quadratic relationship for board size and independence provides a pointer for further 
research. There is significant scope for exploring this relationship further to 
investigate whether the tangible impact of affiliation on a range of market and non-
market performance metrics. Control variable leverage, R&D expenditure and firm 
age are negatively correlated to firm performance at least at the 1% level. Firm size is 
positively related to firm value at the 1% level. Overall these findings are consistent 
with expectation and the extant empirical evidence.  
 
 Insert table 7 about here 
 
        As a robustness check we also consider the potential impact of endogeneity 
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between board independence and performance. Similar to the argument made by 
Dahya et al. (2007) and Choi et al. (2007), government regulation is an exogenous 
shock that influences the decision to implement the independent director system. 
Table 8 reports results for two-stage least squares regression. Initially, lagged 
ownership and board variables are employed to control for potential endogeneity. 
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression incorporates the proportion of independent 
directors and supervisors in the first stage and the estimated values of the first stage 
for measuring firm performance in the second stage. Board size and its square are 
employed as the instrumental variables. We add lagged ownership and board variables 
with contemporaneous control variables used in table 7 and also include year and 
industry dummies in the model. The results for the 2SLS regression are reported in 
Table 8 which show that board independence is significantly positively correlated 
with firm performance at the 5% level after accounting for potential endogeneity. 
Insert table 8 about here 
 
6. Conclusion 
Empirical evidence documents a market value discount for firms with concentrated 
ownership structure to reflect the tendency of controlling shareholder to expropriate 
resources at the expense of minority investors, but points to performance benefits 
from enhancing board independence. Taiwan, in common with other East-Asian 
economies, participated in the independent director reform wave with the 1997-98 
Asian financial crisis providing impetus for governance reform in the region. From 
February 2002 regulators advised new stock market listings to appoint at least two 
independent directors and one independent supervisor. Implementation was on a 
„comply-or-explain‟ basis and was accompanied by criteria specifying „independence‟. 
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        Consistent with the empirical evidence and agency theory, we adopt the working 
assumption that controlling shareholders in Taiwan have overwhelming power and 
will appoint independent directors only if they believe it is in their interest to do so. 
We find a significant positive relationship between board independence and 
controlling shareholders‟ cash-flow rights for firms where the appointee was affiliated 
to the board. In contrast, we document a significant improvement in firms‟ next 
period Return-on-Assets only for firms where independent director appointments 
were unaffiliated to the board. We argue that the positive association for affiliated 
directors and controlling shareholders cash-flow rights reflects their desire to diminish 
board quality to accommodate the extraction of private benefits of control to 
compensate for the costs associated with being a block shareholder. In contrast, when 
controlling shareholders require performance improvement they appoint unaffiliated 
independent directors for their expertise which, in the context of this study, led to 
performance improvement which is consistent with the body of empirical evidence for 
developing economies reporting a causal link from director independence to 
performance (Choi et al, 2007; Dahya et al. 2008; Liu et al, 2015).  
        The findings reported in this paper contribute to the sparse literature on social 
ties and provide insights which are relevant to the current policy debate in Taiwan. 
Definitions of independent directors‟ „independence‟ and their effectiveness is at the 
heart of the independent director debate. Our analysis suggests that there is a 
significant difference between appointees depending upon their prior affiliation to the 
board. By 2017 all Taiwanese boards must have independent directors who conform 
to the regulatory criteria for independence. Our analysis prompts a thought 
experiment: if unaffiliated independent appointees enhance firm performance, then, 
ceteris parabis, it would be in their interest of all stakeholders if regulators could 
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amend the regulatory definition of independence to capture the performance benefits 
of unaffiliated independent appointments. A simple rule derived from our analysis 
could be that independent director appointments must not have sat on the board 
they‟ve been appointed to previously. Alternatively, the Asia Corporate Governance 
Association in their biennial report (2015) proposes allowing minority shareholders to 
vote separately on the appointment of independent directors similar to the UK. 
Evidently, the power of controlling shareholders and the appointment of independent 
directors is an unresolved issue in the region.  
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Table 1 
Selection Criteria 
Criteria TWSE GTSM 
 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Panel A. 
Total companies in 
Market 
544 334 
Less   
  IPO Companies 
(Since Feb 2002) 
67 48 
  Financial Companies 27 13 
Panel B. 
Re-election 168 145 137 85 91 97 
Less       
   Missing ownership or 
accounting data 
17 7 4 27 36 39 
Final Sample 146 137 133 58 53 58 
       
Compliant type:       
  Compliant 45 26 29 27 19 9 
         Affiliated Ind. 30 11 7 17 9 2 
         Unaffiliated Ind. 15 15 22 10 10 7 
  Non-Compliant 101 111 104 31 34 49 
Notes: This table verifies the selection criteria of this study. The initial sample for this study consists of 
all non-financial firms listed on the TWSE and GTSM. It contains for firms which had a re-election at 
the annual general meeting from 2002 to 2004, respectively. The final sample eliminated IPO 
companies which listed after February 2002 and the firms with missing ownership and accounting data. 
Compliant types were classified as compliant if company appointed on independent director or 
independent supervisor. The affiliated independent appointment is defined as firm appointed at least 
one independent director who was already sat on the board before the election year. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Variable Definitions 
 Independent 
variables    
 
Variable description 
 
Coefficient 
Ownership 
variables 
Ownership The proportion of cash-flow rights held by the 
largest controlling shareholder group at the 
beginning of year 
01 
 
Excess Control rights – Cash-flow rights×(1-Director 
Pledged Ratio) at the beginning of year  
Board 
variables 
Affiliate director 
(Dira) 
The ratio of directors affiliated with the largest 
controlling shareholder to total number of 
directors at the beginning of year 
 γ1 < 0 
Affiliated 
supervisor 
(Supa) 
The ratio of supervisors affiliated with the largest 
controlling shareholder to total number of 
supervisors at the beginning of year 
 γ2 < 0 
Duality A dummy variable that equals one if CEO also 
serve as Chairman of the board and equals zero, 
otherwise 
 γ3 ≠ 0 
Bsize Total number of board of directors and 
supervisors 
 γ4 ≠ 0 
Bsize
2
 Quadratic specification: Board size squared   γ5 ≠ 0 
Control 
variables 
Tobin‟s Q The sum of market value of equity and the book 
value of debt divided by the book value of assets. 
 
 ROA After-tax earnings before interest dividend by 
total assets 
 
 LagQ One year Tobin‟s Q prior the fiscal year  
 LagROA One year ROA prior the fiscal year  
 Leverage Ratio of book value of debt to book value of 
asset 
 
 R&D Research and development expenses over sale  
 Size Logarithm of book value of asset  
 Institute Sum of domestic and foreign institutional 
shareholdings at the end of year  
 
 Market A dummy variable that equals one if the 
company is listed on the TWSE and zero if the 
company is listed on the GTSM. 
 
 Age Logarithm of firm age  
Notes: This table provides the definition of independent variables with the expected sign of coefficients. 
The data on board structure and board characteristics are collected from annual reports, company 
prospectus and “Business groups in Taiwan”, ownership and accounting variables are collected from 
Taiwan economic journal (TEJ). 
02 
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Min 
 
25% 
 
Median 
 
75% 
 
Max 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Min 
 
25% 
 
Median 
 
75% 
 
Max 
Panel A: TWSE sample (N: 416) Panel B: GTSM sample (N: 169) 
Ownership structure               
  Control (%) 29.84 16.62 0.19 17.34 27.82 42.46 95.39 28.84 16.24 2.28 16.34 25.50 39.47 68.96 
  Ownership (%) 25.05 17.09 0.13 11.32 22.40 36.13 95.34 24.79 16.85 0.25 12.80 20.68 33.76 66.22 
  Excess (%) (Control – 
Ownership) 
4.79 8.29 0 0.02 1.01 5.22 45.94 4.06 7.67 0 0 1.05 4.10 37.11 
Board structure                
  Number of directors  7.33    3.09 3 5 7 9 21 6.29 2.32 2 5 6 7 27 
  Number of supervisors 2.60  0.74 1 2 3 3 7 2.55 0.61 1 2 3 3 5 
  Number of independent 
directors 
0.32 0.73 0 0 0 0 4 0.41 0.74 0 0 0 1 2 
    Number of independent 
supervisors 
0.21 0.47 0 0 0 0 2 0.31 0.53 0 0 0 1 3 
  Affiliate director  
  (Dira) (%) 
57.27 30.23 0 33 57 82.34 100 45.46 25.09 0 25 40 60 100 
  Affiliate supervisor 
  (Supa) (%) 
47.92 39.34 0 0 50 100 100 23.53 27.98 0 0 0 50 100 
  Duality 0.29 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 0.38 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
  Board size 9.93 3.46 1 8 9 12 26 8.84 2.60 3 7 8 10 32 
  Pledged (%) 16.89 23.54 0 0 3.01 29.12 98.75 6.23 14.63 0 0 0 4.15 81.92 
Firm characteristics               
  Total assets  
  (NT$ million) 
20700 52100 541 3119 6089 12400 467000 3442 9676 284 949 1562 2516 78600 
  R&D over sales (%) 1.85 3.73 0 0 0.59 2.35 44.67 3.47 7.70 0 0 1.16 3.62 66.21 
  Tobin‟s Q 1.09 0.49 0.45 0.82 0.98 1.22 5.69 1.32 1.17 0.55 0.80 0.99 1.30 8.79 
  ROA (%) 3.90 8.07 -52 1 4 8 39 0.78 11.02 -56 -2 2.98 6.28 29 
  Leverage (%) 40.59 16.09 5 29 40.36 49 96 43.02 17.76 4 32 43 54 92.51 
  LagQ 1.07 0.61 0.47 0.75 0.92 1.18 8.67 1.47 1.89 0.48 0.81 1.01 1.30 15.82 
  LagROA (%) 3.42 7.52 -49 0.39 3.12 7 40 1.52 10.09 -60 -1 2.64 6 23 
  Institute (%) 3.62 5.97 0 0 0.89 4.87 38.94 2.17 5.68 0 0 0 1.34 37.40 
Notes: This table summarizes the descriptive statistics for the year 2002 to 2004. The sample of 585 Taiwanese non-financial companies is split into separate markets: TWSE 
in Panel A and GTSM in Panel B. 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. %NED 0.10
b 
-0.13
c 
-0.18
c 
-0.18
c 
0.10
b 
0.002 0.08
a 
0.17
c 
0.07
a 
0.18
c 
-0.10
b 
0.05 -0.10
b 
0.09
b 
-0.09
b 
2. Ownership  -0.04 0.21
c 
0.17
c 
0.04 -0.10
b 
-0.05 0.12
c 
-0.06 0.17
c 
0.01 -0.14
c 
-0.14
c 
-0.10
b 
0.007 
3. Excess   0.16
c 
0.21
c 
-0.10
b 
0.08
a 
-0.04 0.05 -0.08
b 
0.007 0.13
c 
-0.06 0.22
c 
0.03 0.17
c 
4. Dira    0.65
c 
-0.04 -0.08
a 
-0.05 -0.01 0.006 -0.04 0.03 -0.16
c 
0.21
c 
-0.15
c 
0.18
c 
5. Supa     -0.03 -0.02 -0.08
a 
0.006 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.12
c 
0.32
c 
-0.10
b 
0.29
c 
6. Duality      -0.21
c 
0.07
a 
-0.02 0.07
a 
-0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.20
c 
-0.05 -0.09
b 
7. Bsize       -0.06 0.14
c 
-0.08
a 
0.11
c 
-0.06 -0.05 0.34
c 
0.07 0.15
c 
8. Tobin‟s Q        0.04 0.83
c 
0.19
c 
-0.03 0.15
c 
-0.02 0.16
c 
-0.13
c 
9. ROA         -0.09
b 
0.65
c 
-0.34
c 
-0.11
c 
0.20
c 
0.20
c 
0.15
c 
10. LagQ          0.09
b 
-0.003 0.15
c 
-0.02 0.11
c 
-0.16
c 
11. LagROA           -0.31
c 
-0.03 0.15
c 
0.26
c 
0.10
b 
12. Leverage            -0.22
c 
0.03 -0.03 -0.06 
13. R&D             -0.06 0.08
a 
-0.14
c 
14. Size              0.27
c 
0.49
c 
15. Institute               0.11
c 
16. Market               1 
Notes: This table analyses the Pearson correlation for dependent and independent variables. The total sample includes 585 Taiwanese non-financial companies.  %NED is 
defined as the logistic transformation of proportion of independent directors and supervisors on the board. Other variable definitions are given in table 2. 
a
, 
b
 and 
c
 denote 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 44 
 
 
Table 5 
Board Independence and Ownership Structure  
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Dependent Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ownership 0.025 
(0.008)*** 
0.024 
(0.008)*** 
0.024 
(0.009)*** 
0.022 
(0.008)*** 
Excess -0.025 
(0.012)** 
-0.026 
(0.012)** 
-0.023 
(0.012
)*
 
-0.024 
(0.012)** 
Dira -0.011 
(0.005)** 
 -0.011 
(0.005)** 
 
Supa 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Duality 0.408 
(0.299) 
0.427 
(0.301) 
0.455 
(0.301) 
0.471 
(0.303) 
Bsize 0.432 
(0.134)*** 
0.436 
(0.137)*** 
0.448 
(0.133)*** 
0.455 
(0.135)*** 
Bsize2 -0.014 
(0.005)*** 
-0.014 
(0.005)*** 
-0.015 
(0.005)*** 
-0.015 
(0.005)*** 
ROA 0.057 
(0.017)*** 
0.057 
(0.017)*** 
 
 
LagROA 
 
 0.050 
(0.016)*** 
0.050 
(0.016)*** 
Leverage 0.002 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
R&D -0.015 
(0.021) 
-0.011 
(0.022) 
-0.026 
(0.021) 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
Size -0.213 
(0.143) 
-0.210 
(0.144) 
-0.200 
(0.144) 
-0.202 
(0.146) 
Institute 0.022 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.024) 
0.019 
(0.024) 
0.019 
(0.024) 
Market -0.067 
(0.369) 
-0.052 
(0.374) 
-0.044 
(0.372) 
-0.036 
(0.377) 
Constant -7.018 
(2.298)*** 
-7.762 
(2.323)*** 
-7.248 
(2.312)*** 
-7.937 
(2.339)*** 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.174 0.171 0.168 
F-test 6.72*** 6.94*** 5.83*** 6.23*** 
N 585 585 585 585 
Notes: This table presents the relationship between board independence and ownership variables. The total sample 
includes 585 Taiwanese non-financial companies. The results of OLS regression analysis where the dependent variable 
is the logistic transformation of proportion of independent directors and supervisors on the board. The independent 
variables include measures of ownership, board structure and other firm‟s characteristics. All independent variable 
definitions are given in table 2. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Unaffiliated and Affiliated Independent Board Member Appointments 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Affiliated 
Independent 
Unaffiliated 
Independent 
Affiliated 
Independent 
Unaffiliated 
Independent 
Affiliated 
Independent 
Unaffiliated 
Independent 
Affiliated 
Independent 
Unaffiliated 
Independent 
Ownership 0.027 
(0.009)*** 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.028 
(0.009)*** 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.026 
(0.009)*** 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.028 
(0.009)*** 
0.009 
(0.009) 
Excess -0.032 
(0.009)* 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.031 
(0.019) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
-0.030 
(0.019) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.029 
(0.019) 
-0.017 
(0.016) 
Dira -0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
  -0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
  
Supa   -0.009 
(0.005)** 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
  -0.009 
(0.005)** 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Duality 0.297 
(0.306) 
0.309 
(0.299) 
0.316 
(0.306) 
0.341 
(0.298) 
0.335 
(0.304) 
0.362 
(0.299) 
0.352 
(0.305) 
0.395 
(0.299) 
Bsize 0.906 
(0.289)*** 
0.768 
(0.309)*** 
0.879 
(0.305)*** 
0.796 
(0.306)*** 
0.908 
(0.295)*** 
0.777 
(0.307)** 
0.885 
(0.308)*** 
0.809 
(0.302)*** 
Bsize2 -0.038 
(0.013)*** 
-0.027 
(0.013)** 
-0.037 
(0.013)*** 
-0.028 
(0.013)** 
-0.039 
(0.013)*** 
-0.028 
(0.013)** 
-0.037 
(0.013)*** 
-0.028 
(0.013)** 
ROA 0.048 
(0.019)** 
0.041 
(0.021)** 
0.048 
(0.019)** 
0.043 
(0.020)** 
    
LagROA     0.036 
(0.020)* 
0.034 
(0.018)* 
0.035 
(0.021)* 
0.037 
(0.018)** 
Leverage 0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
R&D 0.002 
(0.019) 
0.023 
(0.024) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.018 
(0.022) 
-0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.027 
(0.022) 
Size -0.191 
(0.153) 
-0.091 
(0.134) 
-0.148 
(0.156) 
-0.118 
(0.138) 
-0.184 
(0.155) 
-0.080 
(0.134) 
-0.144 
(0.156) 
-0.111 
(0.139) 
Institute -0.002 
(0.027) 
0.019 
(0.023) 
-0.004 
(0.029) 
0.020 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.027) 
0.020 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.028) 
0.022 
(0.021) 
Market 0.046 
(0.349) 
-0.131 
(0.351) 
0.060 
(0.351) 
-0.143 
(0.350) 
0.057 
(0.351) 
-0.118 
(0.351) 
0.070 
(0.353) 
-0.129 
(0.351) 
Constant -5.208 
(2.713)* 
-4.378 
(2.37)* 
-6.068 
(2.796)** 
-4.781 
(2.348)** 
-5.189 
(2.731)* 
-4.509 
(-2.401)* 
-5.972 
(2.805)** 
-4.921 
(2.367)** 
Industry 
Dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log 
likelihood 
-357.21 -356.89 -359.02 -358.90 
Persudo R
2
 0.198 0.199 0.194 0.195 
N 585 585 585 585 
Notes: This table reports the results of multinomial logistic regression examining the determinants of 
independent board member appointment. The results are reported separately for affiliated independent board 
member appointment and unaffiliated independent board member appointment. The independent variables 
include measures of ownership, board structure and other firm‟s characteristics. All independent variable 
definitions are given in table 2. Heteroscedasticity-consistent Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Firm Performance and Board Independence 
       
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Board independence 0.202 
(0.102)** 
0.239 
(0.106)** 
    
Board independence 
dummy 
  1.525 
(0.758)** 
1.791 
(0.790)** 
  
Affiliated independent     0.548 
(0.978) 
0.725 
(0.963) 
Unaffiliated independent     2.455 
(0.922)*** 
2.770 
(0.997)*** 
Ownership 9,957 
(0.019)*** 
0.060 
(0.019)*** 
0.058 
(0.019)*** 
0.061 
(0.020)*** 
0.059 
(0.019)*** 
0.063 
(0.020)*** 
Excess 0.047 
(0.033) 
0.054 
(0.033) 
0.047 
(0.033) 
0.054 
(0.033) 
0.045 
(0.033) 
0.052 
(0.032) 
Dira -0.052 
(0.031)* 
 -0.052 
(0.031)* 
 -0.050 
0.021) 
 
Supa  -0.029 
(0.013)** 
 -0.029 
(0.013)** 
 -0.029 
(0.013)** 
Duality 0.824 
(0.905) 
0.951 
(0.937) 
0.825 
(0.905) 
0.952 
(0.937) 
0.803 
(0.903) 
0.925 
(0.934) 
Bsize 0.344 
(0.303) 
0.355 
(0.329) 
0.341 
(0.303) 
0.352 
(0.329) 
0.331 
(0.303) 
0.338 
(0.328) 
Bsize2 -0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
Institute 0.197 
(0.061)*** 
0.194 
(0.061)*** 
0.196 
(0.061)*** 
0.194 
(0.061)*** 
0.200 
(0.063)*** 
0.198 
(0.063)*** 
Leverage -0.192 
(0.024)*** 
-0.190 
(0.024)*** 
-0.192 
(0.024)*** 
-0.190 
(0.024)*** 
-0.191 
(0.024)*** 
-0.189 
(0.024)*** 
R&D -0.487 
(0.157)*** 
-0.482 
(0.155)*** 
-0.486 
(0.156)*** 
-0.482 
(0.155)*** 
-0.448 
(0.157)*** 
-0.484 
(0.155)*** 
Firm Size 1.862 
(0.353)*** 
1.887 
(0.379)*** 
1.861 
(0.353)*** 
1.886 
(0.388)*** 
1.826 
(0.356)*** 
1.855 
(0.391)*** 
Firm Age -3.153 
(1.149)*** 
-3.014 
(1.179)*** 
-3.154 
(1.149)*** 
-3.014 
(1.179)** 
-3.206 
(1.153)*** 
-3.067 
(1.185)*** 
Market 0.292 
(1.316) 
0.303 
(1.321) 
0.293 
(1.316) 
0.304 
(1.321) 
0.322 
(1.315) 
0.334 
(1.321) 
Constant -7.540 
(6.719) 
-11.182 
(6.769) 
-9.149 
(6.723) 
-13.081 
(6.679)
†
 
-8.837 
(6.739) 
-12.667 
(6.699)
†
 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.247 0.247 
F-test 6.56*** 6.58*** 6.55*** 6.57*** 6.29*** 6.31*** 
N 583 583 583 583 583 583 
Notes: This table presents the relationship between firm performance and board independence. The results of 
OLS regression analysis where the dependent variable is return on assets (ROA). The independent variables 
include the logistic transformation of proportion of independent directors and supervisors on the board, the 
dummy variable equals one if the firm appointed at least one independent director or supervisor on the board 
and zero otherwise, the dummy variable equals one if board contain at least one affiliated independent director 
and the dummy variable equals one if firm only appoints unaffiliated independent director(s) on the board and 
zero otherwise. Other independent variables include measures of ownership, board structure and other firm‟s 
characteristics. All independent variable definitions are given in table 2. All board and ownership explanatory 
variables are one year lagged. All other variables are contemporaneous. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Two-Stage Least Square Regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Board Independence ROA Board Independence ROA 
Board 
Independence 
 2.298 
(0.916)** 
 2.205 
(0.859)*** 
Ownership 0.030 
(0.008)*** 
0.010 
(0.036) 
0.028 
(0.008)*** 
0.017 
(0.032) 
Excess -0.024 
(0.013)* 
0.097 
(0.044)** 
-0.025 
(0.013)* 
0.098 
(0.042)** 
Dira -0.011 
(0.005)** 
0.022 
(0.026) 
  
Supa   -0.006 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
Duality 0.452 
(0.303) 
-0.170 
(0.995) 
0.469 
(0.304) 
-0.138 
(0.962) 
Bsize 0.494 
(0.136)*** 
 0.496 
(0.139)*** 
 
Bsize2 -0.016 
(0.005)*** 
 -0.016 
(0.005)*** 
 
Institute 0.033 
(0.024) 
0.141 
(0.096) 
0.031 
(0.024) 
0.144 
(0.091) 
Leverage -0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.189 
(0.032)*** 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.191 
(0.030)*** 
R&D -0.038 
(0.020)* 
-0.288 
(0.114)** 
-0.035 
(0.020)* 
-0.297 
(0.110)*** 
Firm Size -0.159 
(0.141) 
1.313 
(0.439)** 
-0.154 
(0.143) 
1.312 
(0.420)** 
Firm Age -0.345 
(0.361) 
-2.008 
(1.214)* 
-0.388 
(0.359) 
-1.932 
(1.173) 
Market 0.036 
(0.376) 
0.951 
(1.186) 
0.063 
(0.381) 
0.940 
(1.141) 
Constant -6.331 
(2.475)** 
15.678 
(8.702)* 
-6.910 
(2.515)*** 
10.300 
(7.413) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1602 0.3287 0.1587 0.3290 
F-test 5.42*** 159.79*** 5.81*** 165.59*** 
N 585 585 585 585 
Note: This table reports the two-stage least square regression. The instruments include lagged ownership and 
board variables and all contemporaneous control variables used in Table 7. In addition, the board size and its 
square are added in the first stage. The year and industry dummies are also included in the model. The 
dependent variable is the proportion of independent director and supervisor in the first stage and firm 
performance in the second stage. All independent variable definitions are given in table 2. Heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Highlights  
• Higher cash-flow rights for controllers prefer to appoint affiliated independent 
• Increase in subsequent operating performance for unaffiliated independent 
appointment 
• Independence criteria are important to the performance improvement of firms 
• The regulatory compliant independent director appointments are not the same 
